巫统政府恶意让马来西亚华裔大量流失优秀人才，讓他一厥不起，再永远控制他
马荷加尼《週六凌晨3點大雨中》，有一段文，说明苏联以前如何密谋消灭波兰最优秀的人才，重创波兰民族，让他们一蹶不振，好让苏联可以永远控制他们。
马来西亚或是从中得来灵感，虽然没有做到那么丧心病狂，却也做了很多足以让马来西亚华裔大量流失优秀人才的动作和政策。
其目的是否与苏联一样？
这想法让我不寒而栗。
我希望这不是真的。
这会是真的吗？
=======================
70年前，也是第二次世界大戰爆發之前，納粹德國的希特勒，和蘇聯的斯大林達致秘密協議，兩國互不侵犯的同時，也同意兩國瓜分周圍國家。
夾在德、蘇之間，就是可憐的波蘭。
蘇聯紅軍佔領了波蘭，併吞之餘，還不滿足；它把波蘭全國最優秀的軍官、知識份子、政治家等，共2萬2000人，虜到卡廷森林囚禁，然後每天鎗決300人，為時數月，直到完全處決為止。
蘇聯共產黨的目的是消滅波蘭最優秀的人才，重創波蘭民族，讓它一厥不起，徹底衰敗，永遠不能反抗。
蘇共封鎖這個它歷史上最醜陋之一的行為。直到蘇聯瓦解，俄羅斯第一任總統耶爾欣上台，才解密公開，震驚全球。
http://cforum5.cari.com.my/viewthread.php?tid=1918682&extra=page%3D1
2010年4月15日星期四
2010年4月3日星期六
How the UMNO Malay had cheated the Orang Asli in Malaysia
How the UMNO Malay had cheated the Orang Asli in Malaysia
Mahathir and
THE INVISIBLE ORANG ASLI
Colin Nicholas
Published in Bridget Welsh (Ed.) (2004), Reflections: The Mahathir Years. John Hopkins University, Washington DC., pp. 220-230.
The Orang Asli (original or first peoples) are the descendants of the earliest known inhabitants who occupied the Malay peninsula before the establishment of the Malay kingdoms. While some of their 780 settlements are to be found along the coast, on the plains, and on the fringe of urban areas, the majority of the Orang Asli live close to, or within, forest areas. Nevertheless, each Orang Asli community inhabits a specific geographical space, which it calls its adat or traditional land, and draws its culture, identity and spirituality on the basis of its close relationship with this particular ecological niche. For the most part the Orang Asli have been a forgotten community except when their land, labour, knowledge or especially their votes, mattered more to others.
Politically, although the Orang Asli have traditionally been supporters of the ruling coalition front, their electoral loyalty is often towards a particular person rather than to a particular party. Thus former Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba was held in high regard by the Orang Asli. So too was Tengku Razeleigh, both when he was in government and when he was the leader of the opposition Parti Melayu Semangat '46. Dr. Mahathir too was accorded this honour, even though he was on the ground far fewer times than the afore-mentioned two leaders.
To most Orang Asli, Dr. Mahathir reflected moderation, developmentism, secularism, and outspokenness (often bordering on bravery) on many issues they identified with. On the other hand, for example, the deposed Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, was never really accepted by the Orang Asli mainly because of his early image as a firebrand Muslim. Thus, during the turbulent Reformasi years (1998-2000), many Orang Asli were convinced that Dr. Mahathir was generally correct in his actions. Similarly, during the 1999 elections, the opposition parties found it hard to win the votes of the Orang Asli in most constituencies-primarily because the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front) was identified with Anwar Ibrahim and PAS, entities that spelt conversion to Islam to many Orang Asli.
The dynamism and charisma of Dr. Mahathir were perceived, by the Orang Asli, as a source of hope for Orang Asli progress and justice. This view was unfortunately misplaced-for during Mahathir's tenure as Prime Minister, and even when he was the Minister in charge of Orang Asli affairs, the situation of the Orang Asli either remained unchanged or worsened, as this forgotten minority was further marginalized.
Threat to identity: Increased Islamization
For example, despite Mahathir's initial secular outlook, it is ironic that during his tenure, there were greater efforts to convert the Orang Asli to Islam than during the terms of his predecessors. In 1983, strategies were developed to achieve "the Islamization of the whole Orang Asli community and their integration/assimilation with the Malay race". One strategy involved the implementation of a "positive discrimination" policy towards the Orang Asli who converted. The converts were given material benefits both individually and via development projects for the community. In fact, more recently, some government officers responsible for Orang Asli development and welfare have been going as far as to blatantly tell the Orang Asli that their development was conditional on their converting to Islam.
Perhaps more than any other group in Malaysia, the Orang Asli have faced the most pressure to convert. While all would agree that those bent on converting the Orang Asli were not acting on the directive of the Prime Minister, there was not a clear directive to the contrary from him. The consequences have been serious, undermining local culture and social structure, but more so in cultivating discrimination and discontent among the Orang Asli, with the resulting community disunity enabling outsiders to exploit Orang Asli lands and resources with ease.
Losing Land, Losing Rights
Also, what little land that had been legally demarcated as Orang Asli reserves, has whittled away during Dr. Mahathir's stewardship-from 20,667 hectares in 1990 to 19,507 hectares in 1999. Furthermore, areas that have been earmarked for gazetting as Orang Asli reserves in the 1960s and 1970s, still have not had their paperwork completed and remain as 'approved' or 'applied' lands with contentious legal rights. Worse still, in many areas these lands are now classified as 'state land'. And the land titles that have been frequently paraded as being given to the Orang Asli, if given, are only Temporary Occupancy Licences (TOL) leases, and for much smaller areas than they traditionally owned.
Without their rights to adat lands legally recognized, the Orang Asli have lost their traditional territories to dams, airports, universities, golf courses, highways, recreation parks and resorts, oil palm plantations, housing and commercial townships, logging concessions and forest management units, national parks and conservation areas, industrial centers and even to private individuals. Dams, in particular, such as the Temenggor dam in Upper Perak that displaced Jahai and Temiar communities there, epitomize the imposition of one way of life over another; where the water and power needs of urban folks ride over the rights of Orang Asli to their land, their way of life, and their right to survival with dignity.
Worsening Conditions: Poverty, Health and Education
Also, while the general development of the country was certainly visible during Dr. Mahathir's tenure, for the Orang Asli their situation actually worsened. For example, while the national poverty rate was reduced to single digit levels, the rate for the Orang Asli increased and continues to hover around 81 percent.
This high level of poverty among the community has not dented the rise in the number of Orang Asli businessmen-Orang Asli Baru" (New Orang Asli) -- who have largely bettered their economic situation at the expense of the community, largely through logging activities and development projects in Orang Asli areas obtained on the "merit" of their good relations with the authorities and on the strength of their Orang Asli identity. Not surprisingly, the level of inequality among the Orang Asli has increased.
In terms of health, despite relative improvements in medical services, the Orang Asli still continue to face problems that reflect underdevelopment. The Orang Asli are still disproportionately afflicted with health problems-specifically tuberculosis, malaria, leprosy, cholera, typhoid, measles and whooping cough-that are easily preventable and curable. Data on Orang Asli health also indicate that malnutrition is highly prevalent.
Statistics during the Mahathir era paint a clearer and depressing picture. The infant mortality rate for the Orang Asli is more than triple that of the general population. Similarly, the crude death rate for the Orang Asli is double that of the national population. The life expectancy of Orang Asli at birth is estimated at 52 years for females and 54 years for males. This is significantly lower than that for the national population, 68 and 72 years respectively. More Orang Asli women also die in childbirth relative to other Malaysians. In 1994, for example, an Orang Asli woman was 119 times more likely to die in childbirth than a Malaysian mother nationally.
In a similar vein, while there has been some improvement in the levels of education attained among the Orang Asli, education levels still lag far behind those achieved by other communities. In general, about 62 per cent of Orang Asli schoolchildren drop out of school each year while 94.4 per cent do not go beyond secondary (SPM) level. A major reason for this trend has been the lack of facilities and trained teachers assigned to the Orang Asli community, especially before 1995.
The former opposition leader, Tan Chee Khoon, published articles in The Star and Utusan Melayu in the early 1980s addressing similar lamentable statistics regarding the Orang Asli. He opined that if all these things were happening to the Malay community, there would be a big hue and cry and some heads would roll. Two decades on, and the situation is not much better for the Orang Asli. And no official heads have even turned.
Strategic Engagement: Politically Useful, At Times
Why is the situation of the Orang Asli so despairingly far from that of the rest of the country? Apparently, like most others, Dr. Mahathir sees the Orang Asli-at 133,000 just a little over half a per cent of the national population-as an insignificant minority; that is, politically unimportant. I cannot recall any time when the Prime Minister displayed a genuine interest in the Orang Asli's development and welfare. On the contrary, of the few times when big events were organized for mesra sessions with the Orang Asli, it was because Dr. Mahathir needed their political support.
For example, in the run-up to the 1990 elections, the parliamentary constituency of Gua Musang in the state of Kelantan was a key seat in the elections. The incumbent member of parliament was Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, the leader of the Parti Melayu Semangat 46 (whose party consisted mainly of UMNO-breakaways like himself). Tengku Razaleigh was touted as the next prime minister of Malaysia should the opposition win (at the time, not an implausible possibility). Thus, Tengku Razaleigh needed to be ousted from the latter's Gua Musang parliamentary stronghold. This constituency included a very large number of Orang Asli voters, mainly from the Temiar subgroup. From past election results, it was clear that a swing of Orang Asli votes to either side could determine the winner. Thus, for Dr. Mahathir, a sure way to rid himself of his then arch political foe was to ensure that the Orang Asli votes were with the ruling coalition.
However, at that time, there were already rumblings among certain groups of Orang Asli who were disappointed with the broken promises of the ruling politicians. It soon became apparent that there was a directive "from above" to remove all obstacles to a BN win in that seat. The campaign to woo the Orang Asli began in November 1989, with a JHEOA (Department of Orang Asli Affairs) organized conference about their future and development-which allowed them to participate! However, more direct and concerted efforts began in early 1990. In March, Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba visited Pos Brook and Gua Musang, promising land titles for the Orang Asli in the state. A new 10-point strategy to develop the Orang Asli community was also announced during the visit. In April, the JHEOA Director-General announced that the headmen's small annual allowances (or bonuses) would be increased.
In March 1990, the Prime Minister called for, and met, the Peninsular Malaysia Orang Asli Association (POASM) President, Bah Tony; and again asked to meet him in June. These were unusual meetings on a strictly one-to-one basis. According to Bah Tony, Dr. Mahathir thought that he, a Semai, was a Temiar (no coincidence since Gua Musang is Temiar country). He added that Dr. Mahathir's eyes opened wider when told that POASM had 5,000 members. Dr. Mahathir also wanted to know the stance of the Orang Asli towards the government, clearly for clear political reasons. In perhaps a clear exposition of his ignorance of what the Orang Asli aspire and desire, Dr. Mahathir offered Bah Tony government assistance to support handicraft development and marketing
One month before the elections, Dr. Mahathir visited Gua Musang and had a "breakfast meeting" with some Orang Asli. Plans for a big rally had to be scrapped as apparently, word from the ground advised against it. The Prime Minister subsequently "adopted" Gua Musang and commented that the Orang Asli had always been "close to his heart". In the interim JHEOA officers conducted ceramah (talks) in Orang Asli areas or sought support from the Orang Asli for candidates from the ruling coalition.
Dr. Mahathir also set up a high-level, multi-agency Orang Asli Coordinating and Implementation Committee headed by the Secretary-General (KSU) of the Home Ministry (of which Dr. Mahathir was then the Home Minister, and under whose ministry the purview of Orang Asli affairs fell). The special committee met twice and acted decisively, at least verbally, on complaints put forward by POASM representatives. It however suffered a natural death immediately after the general elections (which saw the seat being retained by Tengku Razaleigh, though Dr. Mahathir's coalition party obtained a comfortable majority of the seats nationally). Nevertheless, soon after, Dr. Mahathir transferred the Department of Orang Asli Affairs (JHEOA) to the Rural Development Ministry, thereby absolving himself, as Home Minister, of responsibility for the Orang Asli. While many Orang Asli saw this as a good move-since the Rural Development Ministry was the more competent ministry with adequate resources to resolve their problems-some also saw the abrupt way in which the transfer was made, so suddenly and so soon after the general elections, as an indication of Dr. Mahathir's actual lack of interest in Orang Asli welfare.
Wooing the Orang Asli Again
Very little happened in the ensuing decade until Dr. Mahathir's direct interest in the Orang Asli was again revived in the run-up to the 1999 elections, in the midst of the Reformasi political upheaval. On June 22, 1999, in keeping with tradition in an anticipated election year, the Prime Minister officiated at a big Orang Asli 'jamboree' in Bukit Lanjan, on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. About 600 Orang Asli village-heads were bused in from throughout the Peninsular, ostentatiously to witness a function of a private developer who awarded certificates in building competency to 17 Orang Asli youths who had completed training in skills such as bricklaying, plastering and backhoe operations. The establishment of the training institute (at the construction site) was part of the compensation package for the Orang Asli whose valuable land was acquired by the state and later sold to the private developer.
Ironically, although it was a function of a private developer, the government, through JHEOA, was involved in more ways than would be expected for such an activity. Each of the village-heads who were bused in was given a new long-sleeved batik shirt, a pair of leather shoes, an allowance of RM50.00 and lodging in a 3-star hotel with full board for the two or three days they were away from their settlements-all provided for from the JHEOA coffers. Ironically, the cost of organizing this function, born by the JHEOA, was said to be in excess of RM300,000-more than the initial allocation of RM200,000 set aside for establishing the year-long Orang Asli youth construction skills training programme that was launched that day! Clearly, the occasion was a thinly veiled opportunity for the Prime Minister and the Barisan National to campaign among the Orang Asli with a view to the approaching general elections.
The Prime Minister's speech, in fact, was well received by the Orang Asli guests, especially when he assured them that the government wanted to upgrade their standard of living "without changing their culture and tradition as in having a Tok batin [village head] as their leader". He was probably not aware that the JHEOA had put in place policies where it was the JHEOA who decided ultimately who the batins would be. Dr. Mahathir also stressed how the Orang Asli were being well taken care of by the government, citing the case of Bukit Lanjan, where he spoke from, and also where the relocation exercise of the 158 Temuan families, it was claimed, would soon turn them into millionaires.
"There is no other country where their Aboriginal people become millionaires," the Prime Minister declared, adding that, "In the West, they are herded into reserves and taught to become drunks". He seem to be unaware that only 143 hectares (0.1 per cent) of Orang Asli areas and reserves (131,736 hectares) have any legal title, and that existing Orang Asli reserves were, and are still, being appropriated from the Orang Asli without regard to the protections under the Land Acquisition Act. Moreover, no one however questioned as to how a RM61 million compensation program (that also included compensation in kind) for 158 families could be divided to make them all millionaires. The total value of the development project, incidentally, was RM12.4 billion, making the cost of the land to the developer a mere 0.5 per cent of the project value.
More and more Orang Asli are also being asked to move to resettlement areas, where the land is smaller than their traditional claims, and where the best security of tenure they can get is a TOL lease for 99 years. In these resettlement areas, more and more Orang Asli sadly have sought the bottle to find temporary escape from all the problems they encounter.
All the same, apart from receiving wide coverage in the local print and electronic media, the Prime Minister's speech at this function was screened repeatedly as a TV documentary in November of that year, in the midst of the campaign period for the general elections.
The Invisible Orang Asli
Perhaps the most insensitive comment that Dr. Mahathir could have made for the ears of the Orang Asli was when he declared, on live TV on June 29, 1998 at the opening of the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), that, "one of the reasons why we chose to build the airport here at Sepang was because there was nobody living here". Wisely, none of the printed media carried this comment. But each time I am on a flight taking off or landing on Runway One at KLIA, I think of Batin Senin and his people who had to be relocated to a newly-filled peat swamp area to make way for this new symbol of Dr. Mahathir's 'Malaysia Boleh' vision.
Even today, six years after their relocation, their situation is worse off than they were before the resettlement-due in large part to the poor soil condition and the undelivered development promises, including that of 5 oil palms for each one that they had before. To rub salt into the wound, when representatives of the nearby communities were given a free joy ride in one of Malaysia Airlines' jetliners-as a reward for their sacrifices-not a single Orang Asli was on that flight. Perhaps taking a cue from Dr. Mahathir's speech at the opening ceremony, the Orang Asli were invisible again.
Dr. Mahathir's apparent perception of the Orang Asli is that they are invisible, insignificant. They do not fit into his national design of his "way forward" for Malaysia, towards Vision 2020. Unless of course, they mattered politically. As a believer in the political right and might of the majority, it is not surprising that Dr. Mahathir chooses to treat the Orang Asli as such. In fact, he had already revealed his position vis-a-vis the Orang Asli in his Malay Dilemma. To him, "the Orang Melayu or Malays have always been the definitive people of the Malay Peninsula. The aborigines were never accorded any such recognition nor did they claim such recognition. Above all, at no time did they outnumber the Malays."
For a Prime Minister who was fond of chastizing developed countries for their treatment of their indigenous peoples, Dr. Mahathir, in his classic contradictory self, and his administration are a ripe target for the same accusation. Since Dr. Mahathir was not a hands-on leader when it came to Orang Asli matters, he may have been unaware of how they were treated and relied too much on his officers. Irrespective, the Orang Asli's "invisible" status during Dr. Mahathir's administration, has contributed to their underdevelopment.
The Way Forward
So, where does the future stand for the Orang Asli? Surely it has to be a reversal of the policies that Dr. Mahathir and his administration have put in place for them, intentionally or unwittingly. For a start, the new leadership should take a cue from Gandhi who, if I may paraphrase, considered that a country's progress and development could only be gauged by the way the most marginalized of its people were treated.
The Orang Asli have made many demands and appeals for their community. These include better access to development amenities, freedom (and support) to practice their religion and culture, security of tenure of their traditional lands, affirmative action in areas of education and livelihood advancement, better health facilities, control of their own department (i.e. JHEOA), and recognition of them as indigenous peoples on this land. These are not unreasonable demands. Dr. Mahathir and his administration have already taken so much from the Orang Asli. It is time to give back to the Orang Asli.
References
A. Baer (1999), Health, Disease and Survival: A Biomedical and Genetic Analysis of the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia, Subang Jaya: Center for Orang Asli Concerns.
JHEOA (1983), Strategi Perkembangan Ugama Islam Di Kalangan Masyarakat Orang Asli, Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Orang Asli.
Khor Geok Lin (1994), Resettlement and Nutritional Implications: the Case of Orang Asli in Regroupment Schemes. Pertanika - Journal of the Society for Science and Humanity, 2, 2, pp. 123-132.
Mahathir bin Mohamad (1981) The Malay Dilemma, Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications.
Nicholas, Colin (2000) The Orang Asli and the Contest for Resources: Orang Asli Politics, Development and Identity in Peninsular Malaysia, International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen/Center for Orang Asli Concerns, Subang Jaya.
Orang Asli and the BUMIPUTERA POLICY
Orang Asli and the
BUMIPUTERA POLICY
Colin Nicholas
Published as 'The Orang Asli: First on the Land, Last in the Plan' in: Richard Mason & Arifin S. M. Omar (Eds) (2005), The 'Bumiputera Policy': Dynamics and Dilemmas, special issue of Kajian Malaysia: Journal of Malaysian Studies, Vol. XXI, Nos. 1 & 2, July/December 2004, pp. 315-329.
The Orang Asli ("Original Peoples") are the indigenous minority peoples of Peninsular Malaysia. They are the descendants of the early inhabitants of the peninsula before the establishment of the Malay kingdoms. They number 133,775 today, representing a mere 0.5 per cent of the national population. Anthropologists and administrators have traditionally regarded the Orang Asli as consisting of three main groups which in themselves comprise several distinct tribes or sub-groups. The main groups are the Negrito (Semang), the Senoi, and the Aboriginal-Malay. Each group is further divided into six subgroups.
Linguistically, some of the northern Orang Asli groups (especially the Senoi and Negrito groups) speak languages, now termed Aslian languages, that suggest a historical link with the tribespeople in Burma, Thailand and Indo-China. The members of the Aboriginal-Malay groups of the south speak dialects which belong to the same Austronesian family of languages as Malay, with the exceptions of the Semelai and Temoq dialects (which are Austroasiatic).
The Orang Asli have equally varied occupations and ways of life. The Orang Laut, Orang Seletar and Mah Meri, for example, live close to the coast and are mainly fishermen. Some Temuan, Jakun and Semai people have taken to permanent agriculture and now manage their own rubber, oil palm or cocoa farms. About 40 per cent of the Orang Asli population – including Semai, Temiar, Che Wong, Jah Hut, Semelai and Semoq Beri – however, live close to, or within forested areas. Here they engage in swiddening (hill rice cultivation) and do some hunting and gathering. These communities also trade in petai, durian, rattan and resins to earn cash incomes. A very small number, especially among the Negrito (e.g. Jahai and Lanoh) are still semi-nomadic, preferring to take advantage of the seasonal bounties of the forest. A fair number also live in urban areas and are engaged in both waged and salaried jobs, and there are several professionals among them today.
To a large degree, the Orang Asli remained in relative isolation during the colonial period (ca. 1640s-1940s) and led autonomous, self-sufficient lives primarily because the colonialists regarded them as people of no political or economic import. About the only people who were interested in the Orang Asli then were the missionaries and the anthropologists. Prior to this, however, when Malaya was being peopled by others in the archipelago, the Orang Asli were an organised, independent people, respected enough to be spought for help in the establishment of the early Malay kingdoms (as in Johore, Melaka, Negri Sembilan and perhaps even Perak). Nevertheless, it was events during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) that brought the Orang Asli into the scheme of modern government and control -- and which eventually led them to be categorised as 'bumiputera' although, as I argue below, while they may be indigenes on this land, they are certainly not the princes.
What the bumiputera policy is about
For the purpose of my discussion here, I have interpreted the 'bumiputera policy' to mean more than the mere the economic rights that the general populace normally is concerned with. However, in Malaysian realpolitik, the bumiputera policy is more than this; it is about giving recognition to a category of Malaysians who are perceived to be endowed with special rights and status on account of their primal presence on this land. Thus, apart from economic 'rights', other rights or privileges extended to bumiputeras are the greater protection and recognition of their religion, culture, language, education, representation in government, leadership in key government positions and institutions, and political dominance, just to name a few.
At the onset, I should stress that I am not an adherent of any social or economic doctrine that suggests that social, political or economic rights should be linked or attached to any particular group based purely on the merit of their ancestral blood line, or that others should be discriminated against purely on account of their perceived racial differences or lateness in arrival. I subscribe to the simple rule that fairness and justice should always prevail as the fundamental premise for any distribution of rights, resources and opportunities. This does not rule out exemptions or affirmative actions being taken for a category of people. It does insist however that such departures should be based on the sole purpose of alleviating difficulties and for achieving the demands of justice.
Nevertheless, since I have been tasked to comment on the way in which a peripheral community, the Orang Asli, have been affected by the bumiputera policy, I shall restrict my discussion to the specifics.
Although the term 'bumiputera' is frequently perceived to be directed at the Malays, there is accord that the Orang Asli are also bumiputera, as are also the natives of Sabah and Sarawak. It is also generally perceived by the Orang Asli and the Bornean Malaysians that they are, in most regard, the lesser bumiputeras insofar at least as the (extended) rights and privileges they enjoy are far removed from those enjoyed by the Malays.
So if the Orang Asli are to be assessed in terms of the bumiputera policy, for us in Semenanjung it is only logical that we do so with regard to their progress and advancement vis-à-vis the Malays.
The Orang Asli and Distributive Justice
A quick glance at the social indicators for the Orang Asli, using the government's own figures, will show that the Orang Asli are indeed among the most marginalized of Malaysians today.
Poverty and Wealth
Statistics based on a 1999 survey by the JHEOA show that 81.4 per cent of the Orang Asli live below the poverty line (compared to 8.5 per cent nationally). Of these, 49.9 per cent are among the very poor (compared to 2.5 per cent nationally).
Other indicators also point to the poor quality of life that the Orang Asli experience. For example, only 47.5 per cent of Orang Asli households had some form of piped water, either indoors or outdoors, with 3.9 per cent depending on rivers, streams and wells for their water needs. The availability of toilet facilities as a basic amenity was lacking in 43.7 per cent of the Orang Asli housing units, compared to only 3 per cent at the Peninsular Malaysia level (Department of Statistics 1997: 47). For lighting their homes, 51.8 per cent of Orang Asli households on kerosene lamps (pelita).
Another indicator of wealth (or poverty) is the availability (or absence) of selected household items that could provide an approximate measure of material wellbeing. About a third of the households in the rural settlements (35 per cent) own a motorcycle, confirming its place as an important means of transportation. A fair proportion of both rural and urban Orang Asli households also have access to a radio or television (this negates the presumption that they are 'isolated', or that they are blissfully impervious to outside influences). Significantly, also, almost a quarter (22.2 per cent) of all Orang Asli households did not have any of the selected household items - indicating a "certain lagging in economic development" (Department of Statistics 1997: 42).
Clearly, there must be something wrong in the distribution of economic justice if, while the national poverty rate is decreasing to single-digit levels, that for the Orang Asli is actually increasing and affects more than fourth-fifth of the Orang Asli population.
Educational Attainment
While there has been some improvement in the levels of education attained among the Orang Asli, education levels still lag far behind those achieved by other communities. Almost half (49.2 percent) of the Orang Asli are illiterate, while the remainder (38.5 per cent) have mainly primary education. Only 177 Orang Asli have achieved tertiary education, and this figure is not expected to increase markedly in the near future in view of the meritocracy policy put in place by the government.
In general, about 62 per cent of Orang Asli schoolchildren drop out of school each year while 94.4 per cent do not go beyond secondary (SPM) level. The former opposition leader, Tan Chee Khoon, published articles in The Star and Utusan Melayu in the early 1980s addressing similar lamentable statistics regarding the Orang Asli. He opined that if all these things were happening to the Malay community, there would be a big hue and cry and some heads would roll. Two decades on, and the situation is not much better for the Orang Asli. And no official's head has even turned.
But there are programmes in place today to uplift the standard of education (and so lower the dropout rate) among the Orang Asli, such as the RM4.8m Stay-in-school project announced in 2000. Or the move to transfer the responsibility of Orang Asli education from the JHEOA to the Ministry of Education since 1995. But, as I argue elsewhere, the motivation for doing so is not to promote and advance Orang Asli bumiputera-ism.
Health
In terms of health, the Orang Asli are still disproportionately afflicted with health problems -- specifically tuberculosis, malaria, leprosy, cholera, typhoid, measles and whooping cough -- that are easily preventable and curable. Data on Orang Asli health also indicate that malnutrition is highly prevalent, even 15 years after they have been relocated in government resettlement schemes.
The crude death rates and infant mortality rates for the Orang Asli also do not compare well with the national statistics. Orang Asli generally recorded a much higher infant mortality rate (median=51.7 deaths per 1,000 infants) than the general population (median=16.3). Similarly, the crude death rate for the Orang Asli (median=10.4) was doubled that of the national population (median=5.2). Accordingly, their life expectancy at birth (estimated at 52 years for females and 54 years for males) was also significantly lower than that for the national population (68 years for females and 72 years for males). The lower life expectancy at birth for Orang Asli females could be due to their higher maternal death rates caused by child-birth or poor maternal health (Ng, et al 1987, cited in Razha 1996: 13), or that Orang Asli mothers are over-burdened with reproductive, as well as productive tasks. Maternal mortality is also disproportionately higher among the Orang Asli. For example, of the 42 mothers who died during delivery in 1994, 25 (60 per cent) were Orang Asli women. Given that the Orang Asli community is only 0.5 per cent of the national population, this means that an Orang Asli mother in 1994 was 119 times more likely to die in childbirth than a Malaysian mother nationally.
Thus, despite the relatively good medical service provision, the health problems that the Orang Asli face are still those that reflect underdevelopment (Chee 1996: 63). Nevertheless, experts are of the opinion that there is sufficient information on Orang Asli health available to enable the Orang Asli to enjoy and benefit from better healthcare facilities, especially since most Orang Asli health problems are easily preventable and curable.
Ownership of Land
The attachment Orang Asli have to their traditional lands cannot be over-emphasised. Most Orang Asli still maintain a close physical, cultural and spiritual relationship with the environment. Increasingly, however, Orang Asli are beginning to see the ownership of their traditional lands as an essential prerequisite for their material and economic upliftment. Under present Malaysian laws, the greatest title that the Orang Asli can have to their land is one of tenant-at-will -- an undisguised allusion to the government's perception that all Orang Asli lands unconditionally belong to the state. However, provisions are made for the gazetting of Orang Asli reserves, although such administrative action does not accord the Orang Asli with any ownership rights over such lands.
In 1999, a total of 127,234.6 hectares of Orang Asli land were given some form of recognition by the government, but not full title. Of this, 19,507 hectares (15.3 per cent) were gazetted Orang Asli reserves, while another 29,932 hectares (22.7 per cent) had been approved for gazetting but have yet to be officially gazetted. Still, another 78,795 hectares (61.9 per cent) have been applied for gazetting and for which no approval had been obtained as yet. However, it should be stressed again that these areas are merely those that the government deem to be Orang Asli lands. From calculations made based on the JHEOA's Data Tanah, it was found that the area gazetted represented only 15 per cent of the 779 Orang Asli villages. The remaining villages faced (even greater) insecurity of tenure over their territories.
Of more concern is the realisation that the size of gazetted Orang Asli reserves had actually declined from 20,667 hectares in 1990 to 19,507.4 hectares in 1999 -- a decline of 1,159.6 hectares. Similarly, approval for gazetting have been withdrawn from 7,443.8 hectares of the 36,076 hectares originally approved before 1990. However, there had been an increase (of 11,775 hectares) in new applications for gazetted Orang Asli reserves, mainly for new regroupment schemes where Orang Asli are to be relocated to once their original lands have been taken.
Taken on a per-capita basis, the reserve land allocation works out to 0.15 hectares per Orang Asli. This figure compares poorly to the same computation for the Malays. With the size of the total Malay Reserve Land being 4.413 million hectares (The Sun 23.5.1996), and with a Malay population of 10.2 million in 1996 (The Star 31.1.1998), the Malay reserve land to population ratio is 0.43 hectare per person. This is this is almost triple that for the Orang Asli
In terms of actual titled ownership to Orang Asli traditional lands, the statistics are even more dismal. Only 51.185 hectares (0.28 per cent) of the 18,587 hectares of gazetted Orang Asli reserves were securely titled. Furthermore, in terms of individuals, only 0.02 per cent of Orang Asli (19 individuals) have title to their land.
Orang Asli reserve land, in effect, has none of the security that Malay reservation land guarantees. The government perceives that the Orang Asli are only tenants-at-will (at the will of the government) on their land and it can acquire the land at any time without any need for compensation, save for what the Orang Asli have built or planted on it. Ironically, even in the much-publicised move to grant so-called 'land titles' to Orang Asli, the move involves relocating Orang Asli to new resettlement schemes where in they will be given 99-year Temporary Occupancy Leases (TOL) to up to 6 acres of agricultural land and a quarter acre of homestead for each household. Such a move would usually require the Orang Asli to give up their claim to more than 70 per cent of their traditionalland. In contrast, Felda settler-applicants, who were landless in the first place, get to have 10 acres of agricultural land (for this is what has been established to be the minimum acreage required to keep a household above the poverty line) and full title to the land as well.
The (Missing) Orang Asli in the Federal Constitution
But, as mentioned earlier, the bumiputera policy is not about improving social indicators only. It is also about the exercise of special rights and privileges as provided by the Constitution.
Orang Asli legal commentators have long pointed out that there is a glaring omission in the categories of people that are accorded special privileges under Article 153 (Reservation of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc., for Malays and natives of any of the states of Sabah and Sarawak). Despite being the indigenous peoples of Peninsular Malaysia, the Orang Asli are not made the beneficiaries of the special position assured to the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak by this article. This article posits the mandatory duty of safe-guarding the special position on these 'bumiputeras' in specific areas of economic activity, education and employment on the Yang DiPertuan Agung.
The Orang Asli are, in fact, mentioned in only four places in the Federal Constitution. And that too in a rather unclear way that it has also become increasingly difficult to argue for the same rights and privileges that are accorded to, for example, the Malays (on account of their claim to indigenity). The four places where the Orang Asli are mentioned in the Federal Constitution are:
- Article 8(1), which legitimizes discriminatory legislation in favour
of Orang Asli by way of provisions in the law of their protection,
well-being and advancement (including the reservation of land) or
the reservation to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable
positions in the public service. - Article 45(2), which provide for the appointment of Senators
'capable of representing the interest of the aborigines'. - Article 160(2) which rather unhelpfully defines an aborigine as
'an aborigine of the Malay Peninsula' and Ninth Schedule; List 1
that vests upon the Federal Government legislative authority for
the 'welfare of the aborigines.
An indirect reference to Orang Asli is inferentially made in Article 89 regarding Malay Reservations, which would appear to authorize reservation of such lands in favour of 'natives of the state' besides Malays. But in reality, the government has chosen to interpret the vagueness in the Constitution in its favour, rather than to protect the rights and interests of the Orang Asli bumiputeras. Thus, while the Constitution does authorise the government to enact laws that are in favour of the Orang Asli "for their protection, wellbeing and advancement" it has not done so.
JHEOA: Controlling the Orang Asli
The Orang Asli have the unrivalled 'privilege' of having a specific department to govern them. However, the Department of Orang Asli Affairs (JHEOA) is arguably responsible for making the Orang Asli the most controlled and regulated community in the country. It is run predominantly by non-Orang Asli and exercises wide powers in a variety of functions, including the appointment of village heads, as de-facto 'land-owner' of Orang Asli territories, and as general decision-maker for the community -- in effect effectively treating the Orang Asli as its 'children', as wards of the state.
The JHEOA has also persistently ignored calls by both Orang Asli and non-Orang Asli observers for it to be managed by the Orang Asli themselves, the usual excuse being that there are no Orang Asli who are qualified or who have applied for the job. Both of these arguments are no longer valid, as there are Orang Asli today who have higher qualifications than those presently holding managerial positions in the JHEOA, including that of the top post. Also, there is no programme of working towards the eventual management of the JHEOA by the Orang Asli.
Imagine any other bumiputera agency (such as MARA, PNB or UiTM) being run by a non-Malay, or even a non-bumiputera. So why the exception in the case of the JHEOA?
Accepting Orang Asli Identity
Again, based on the privileges and rights enjoyed by the Malay community as the standard-setter to assess those enjoyed by the Orang Asli, on the basis that both are bumiputera, we now turn to the maintenance, development and regard for Orang Asli identity (including its culture and religion).
When you have an expressed policy to "integrate the Orang Asli with the mainstream society", or more specifically to "assimilate the Orang Asli into the Malay sector of society", you cannot place the Orang Asli on the same level as the dominant bumiputera ethnic group to which it is supposed to assimilate into. Furthermore, the expressed objective to convert all Orang Asli to Islam, coupled with the general inability of the Orang Asli to reject state-sponsored dakwah among its fold, should they want to, clearly indicate that the Orang Asli do not enjoy the same bumiputera 'privileges' as the dominant mainstream society. Also, while there are moves for Orang Asli's culture and arts to be "geared up" not only "to preserve their traditions, but also as tourist attractions", there are no state-sponsored actions to protect and promote Orang Asli traditions and languages, be it in the education system or in mainstream government.
Clearly, therefore, a policy of assimilation for the Orang Asli does not reflect its bumiputera status. Some, however, will be quick to deny that there is such a programme of assimilation directed towards the Orang Asli. Nevertheless, despite the protestations to the contrary, it should be obvious that the policy of Orang Asli "integration with the Malay/mainstream society" is clearly one of assimilation" for domination (when one community takes control of the other), paternalism (which occurs when one society governs the other in what it views as being the other's best interest) and integration (which occurs when single institutions are developed and ethnic origin ceases to be recognised) all occur within the general framework of assimilation (which involves an internalisation of the values of the dominant or majority group).
Political Participation
To a large degree, the Malay claim to political dominance is based on their indigenity. While they may stake their claim as the indigenes of this land, the Orang Asli however do not enjoy the accompanying political clout. On the contrary, two of our Prime Ministers have gone onboard to officially deny any possibility of the Orang Asli getting that status.
"There was no doubt that the Malays were the indigenous peoples of
this land because the original inhabitants did not have any form of
civilisation compared with the Malays ... and instead lived like primitives in
mountains and thick jungle." (Tunku Abdul Rahman, The Star 6.11.1986).
"The Malays are the original or indigenous people of Malaya and the only
people who can claim Malaya as their one and only country... the Orang
Melayu or Malays have always been the definitive people of the Malay
Peninsula. The aborigines were never accorded any such recognition nor
did they claim such recognition... Above all, at no time did they outnumber
the Malays." Mahathir Mohamad (1981: 73).
Save for an Orang Asli senator, who is appointed by the government (and in the case of at least two past senators, the choice had been opposite to what the Orang Asli wanted), the Orang Asli are not represented in any political position, be it at state or federal level. Thus, unlike the other bumiputera groups (for example, in Sarawak where even a minority bumiputera can hold much of the state in his sway), the Orang Asli do not enjoy this 'right'.
Concluding remarks (not a conclusion)
The above discussion seems to go against the grain of what I set out at the beginning insofar as I said that I am not in favour of any social or economic policy that is based purely on ethnic categorisation. It appears that I am saying that the Orang Asli are among the most marginalized of Malaysians because the affirmative policies and actions that should be accorded to them, by virtue of their bumiputera status, were not in fact accorded to them. This is not so.
On the contrary, the high level of poverty among the community has not dented the rise in the number of Orang Asli businessmen "Orang Asli Baru" who have bettered their economic situation at the expense of the community, largely through logging activities and development projects in Orang Asli areas obtained on the "merit" of their good relations with the authorities and on the strength of their Orang Asli identity. This has led to a furthering of the gap between the Orang Asli haves and have-nots (to use a phrase popularised by Tun Razak when he applied the bumiputera body politic at the onset of the NEP).
So why are the Orang Asli still on the periphery? Simply because fairness and justice had not prevailed in the distribution of rights, resources and opportunities. It is not fair when the land you and your ancestors have lived on and tilled for generations is now given to a corporation that only came on the scene a couple of years ago and only because the corporate bosses were able to convince the political masters of their need for it. It is not fair that an Orang Asli student should compete on merit with other students who had the advantage of better facilities, better teachers and a full belly, to enter into an institute of higher learning, while at the same time those Orang Asli who are more qualified to help manage their own department are denied that opportunity. Also, where is the natural justice if you are required to become somebody else, to integrate with the dominant group, and so give up your identity?
Moving Forward
Lest anyone should argue that the Orang Asli are far behind the other Malaysians because they are anti-development, let it be stated clearly that on the contrary the Orang Asli have persistently asked for development -- but on their own terms. The Orang Asli have, in fact, put forward several necessary preconditions for their assured development, well-being and progress. Some of these include:
- Recognise Orang Asli traditional land and accord it permanent title.
Once this is in place, the authorities will be required to treat the
Orang Asli as legitimate land-owners and so deal with them accordingly; - The Government should also recognise the right of the Orang Asli
to use the forest where they reside. (The courts have already done so.) - There should be full and informed participation, including access
to information, in all programmes or projects involving the Orang Asli
communities concerned before a project is implemented. - The Orang Asli should be allowed to administer themselves via the
JHEOA. If necessary, proper training and education should be
given so that the goal of an Orang Asli-run JHEOA is realised. - Orang Asli, like other Malaysian citizens, have a right to basic
infrastructure facilities such as water supply, electricity, roads,
housing, schools and others – and priority should be given to
the provision of these facilities instead of on programmes to
change their values and religion. - The resources of the state and its authority should not be used
to get the Orang Asli to convert to any religion. On the contrary,
such energies and resources should be utilised to further promote the indigenous culture and spirituality.
These are not special privileges that are being asked for. These are basic demands that all Malaysians are entitled to.
The label 'bumiputera' has little meaning or usefulness for most Orang Asli. To them, they are Orang Asli first. And even Orang Asli have rights and privileges as citizens.
Some References
Baer. A. (1999). Health, Disease and Survival: A Biomedical and Genetic Analysis of the Orang Asli of Peninsular Malaysia, Subang Jaya: Center for Orang Asli Concerns.
Barry, Brian (2001). Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculuralism. Polity Press, Cambridge UK.
Bowen. John R. (1999). Should We Have a Universal Concept of "Indigenous Peoples' Rights"? Dunbar-Van Cleve Professor Of Anthropology, Washington University, in St. Louis. [http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/ ~symp2000/jbowen.pdf.]
Commission On Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Working Group on Minorities Ninth session 12-16 May 2003: Minorities and the State in Malaysia and Singapore: Provisions, Predicaments and Prospects (Paper prepared by Lily Zubaidah Rahim, School of Economics and Political Science, University of Sydney, Australia)
JHEOA (1983). Strategi Perkembangan Ugama Islam di Kalangan Masyarakat Orang Asli, Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Orang Asli.
Khor Geok Lin (1994. 'Resettlement and Nutritional Implications: the Case of Orang Asli in Regroupment Schemes', Pertanika: Journal of the Society for Science and Humanity, 2, 2, pp. 123-132.
Lim Heng Seng (1998). Towards Vision 2020: Law, Justice and the Orang Asli. In: Hasan Mat Nor, Pribumi Menhadapi Cabaran Pembangunan, pp. 118-142.
Mahathir bin Mohamad (1981).The Malay Dilemma, Kuala Lumpur: Federal Publications.
Nicholas, Colin (2000). The Orang Asli and the Contest for Resources: Orang Asli Politics, Development and Identity in Peninsular Malaysia, International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen/Center for Orang Asli Concerns, Subang Jaya.
http://www.coac.org.my/codenavia/portals/coacv2/code/main/main_art.php?parentID=11400226426398&artID=11397894520274
1Malaysia - politics first, people later
1Malaysia - politics first, people later
By Jeswan Kaur
COMMENT Information, Communications and Culture Minister Rais Yatim recently said that the 1Malaysia concept has not been understood by Malaysians. One wonders what exactly he means by that.
Looking at the many developments touching on race and religion and the lackaidaisical manner in which the government handled the issues affecting race, religion and the freedom to demonstrate, it is difficult to make sense of what really is the agenda behind 1Malaysia. So Rais a.k.a. the propaganda minister is right in that the 1Malaysia agenda is difficult to fathom.
Some case histories of why 1Malaysia has no depth – if the man behind 1Malaysia, that is, Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak was and is serious about it, he would have made sure his colleagues like Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Najib’s former personal aide Nasir Safar and the likes never escaped unscatched after “abusing” fellow Indians and Chinese of this country.
Hishammuddin, by virtue of his being the home minister, has never failed to overtly declare his devotion to fellow Malays. Case in point is when he supported the protesters of Section 23 in Shah Alam who slaughtered a cow head in protest of a Hindu temple to be built in their neighbourhood.
Who better than the home minister to instil unity among the people – but Hishammuddin never got down to doing so. He is busy threatening mainstream newspapers for their articles, which do carry some grain of truth. So much for 1Malaysia!
Then it was the Herald issue and the “Allah” row which saw churches and a Sikh temple vandalised. How are the non-Muslims to digest such abuse to their places of worship?
Malaysia as a home to people of different races and religions must not be “sold” to the rakyat. It must first be respected and adhered to by the “powers-that-be” before taking it to the rakyat. In this case, clearly the government does not practise what it preaches when it comes to the overly-publicised 1Malaysia.
Najib did not see the need to educate his colleagues on the importance of 1Malaysia because he and they all know that this 1Malaysia is a mere “product” aimed at winning back votes at the 13th general election. For them, there is no faith attached to 1Malaysia, of its importance in uniting the different races in Malaysia and keeping them together always.
Najib definitely should not think twice in rebuking his colleagues and fellow government servants who make racist remarks, making sure his dissatisfaction with such insensitive minds were highlighted by the mainstream newspapers especially. This really is not asking for much, is it? But when Najib made no attempt to apologise for the racist statements made by his then personal aide Nasir at a 1Malaysia event in Malacca last month, that said it all – there is no real commitment in wanting to unite Malaysians. Nasir put in his resignation soon after his racist comments sparked outcry among the Chinese and Indians.
It appears that the 1Malaysia concept is only a cosmetic exercise to woo voters and turn them against the opposition, all to ensure Barisan Nasional reclaims victory in the coming general election which is not far away.
Najib’s double standards
When Nasir showed his true colours by calling Indians beggars and Chinese women prostitutes, it was obvious he was very well aware of what he was saying. To go so far as to say the government could revoke the citizenship of Indians if they made excessive demands and that only Umno was responsible for drafting the Federal Constitution can only be uttered by one with a primitive mindset, which Nasir has well proved to have. Nasir’s resignation to soothe the heated situation is nothing to cry about.
It is a nightmare to know that an outright racist individual like Nasir was once the Johor state assemblyman and division chief.
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It appears that the 1Malaysia concept is only a cosmetic exercise to woo voters and turn them against the opposition...
What is equally puzzling is just how did this personal aide have the audacity to spit such venom against the Indians and Chinese, when his pay master Najib was and is still running around selling 1Malaysia from house to house? Where did Nasir’s racism spark from? Is he one of the ultra conservative Malay Muslims who hate the sight of Indians and Chinese?
It is clear that the 1Malaysia concept is a product Najib has devised for a political reason – to ensure Barisan Nasional’s victory in the general election and to bury the opposition. If 1Malaysia is dear to Najib, he would have wasted no time in berating Nasir and openly apologising for the damage his aide had done and likewise for Hishammuddin. But Najib made no such move, letting his ego get in the way of reaching out to the people and show remorse over Hishammuddin and Nasir’s actions.
Is it not an Asian value and culture to apologise to one another if one has been wronged and disrespected? Why do the so-called leaders in Malaysia not lead by example? Why do they not practise what they preach? It is because politics in Malaysia is their only means to an end, which is to amass as much money and assets as possible while they still can, all at the expense of the public?
What did Najib have to lose by apologising over Nasir’s ill-behaviour? It would have only made the rakyat take Najib seriously if he had said sorry over what Nasir did. But the prime minister has lots of pride and it is getting in the way of his propagating his 1Malaysia.
Najib’s double standards will not help him achieve victory in the coming general election. Apologising requires humility and the current leaders of this country certainly have none of it. At least Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim put Najib to shame when the former openly apologised to Malaysians for choosing the wrong people to lead.
Until people like Nasir are punished for his incendiary words, there is little faith in what 1Malaysia is all about. Likewise, when Hishamuddin challenged the non-Muslims waving a Malay dagger in his hands for questioning the Malay rights, he was not castigated by his boss or warned by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong as the supreme head of the country.
Watching the propaganda of 1Malaysia is getting to be a tired affair because there is no sincerity attached to it. It is very sad that instead of uniting Malaysians, it will be this very 1Malaysia that will go down in history as having torn apart the racial fabric in Malaysia. Harmony in diversity will be a talk of yesterday if Najib does not make any effort to protect Malaysians from verbal abuses spat by his own teammates.
Giving people the basics in life is not doing them a favour. It is the ruling government’s responsibility in ensuring the people have access to the necessary basics and not make them beg for it. Taking the rakyat for granted had proved fatal, as seen in the whacking the Barisan Nasional received in the 12th general election.
Is Perkasa necessary?
If 1Malaysia is Najib’s topmost priority, then why the need to lend support to Perkasa, supposedly a non-governmental organisation but with an agenda to fight for and defend the rights of the Malays which its founder Ibrahim Ali, an MP, feels are being challenged by the non-Malays? To add salt to injury, the home ministry even approved a printing permit to enable Perkasa to publish its fortnightly newspaper Suara Perkasa.
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It is only a matter of time before Perkasa creates pandemonium among the different races in the country all for the sake of ensuring the rights of the dominant race remain safe.
It appears that when it comes to defending Malay rights, Barisan Nasional will have no qualms playing the devil’s advocate. Should we forget how Hishammuddin justified the cowhead protesters’ act of stomping on and spitting on the severed head of the cow, an animal so sacred to the Hindus, all because these ultra Malay protesters did not want a Hindu temple in their neighbourhood?
In the event Perkasa’s motive to defend Malay rights at all cost is supported by the home ministry, more precisely its minister Hishammuddin, then why the fear and later hatred towards Hindraf to the point that it was outlawed and five of its founders imprisoned under the draconian Internal Security Act? This double standard does not augur well for Barisan Nasional and its latest product 1Malaysia.
There is no secret left on what Perkasa’s true intentions are. It is only a matter of time before it creates pandemonium among the different races in the country all for the sake of ensuring the rights of the dominant race remain safe. To allow the existence of Perkasa, founded by a man who is an outright racist, is a big mistake that will take its toll on the Barisan Nasional. When the Sultan of Selangor Sultan Sharafuddin Idris Shah realised the mess he would get into by officiating at Perkasa’s launch on March 27, he wasted no time in pulling out.
And to step in was none other than former premier Dr Mahathir Mohamad – and why? Because Ibrahim, like Zimbabwe’s dictator president Robert Mugabe, is a buddy of Mahathir, never mind the damage that Perkasa is capable of. In Mugabe’s case, Mahathir, then the prime minister, had no qualms misusing his premiership and destroying Malaysia’s rainforest all for the sake of donating $40,000 worth of rare Malaysian rainforest timbers for Mugabe’s new mansion in Harare worth millions.
At that time Najib downplayed this public outcry saying “it was done with the best of intentions”.
With all these show of love “thy neighbour”, should Malaysians welcome 1Malaysia with open arms?
Put people first, not politics
When Najib made his rounds to meet the laymen, that is, visiting Puduraya and Kuala Lumpur’s “little India” in Brickfields soon after he became the prime minister, the move was lauded, but why? What has he done that is so remarkable for the people? Is it not the role of the leader of the country to get his hands dirty to help solve his people’s woes?
Why the red carpet treatment for politicians in this country and that too all the time? Why do the rakyat do themselves a disservice by putting the politicians first and their own needs later? It is this kind-heartedness that the politicians abuse -- always demanding first-class treatment for one thing or the other, forgetting the cardinal rule of becoming a politician, which is that they are the people’s servant and are there to serve them, not to be served by the rakyat.
Najib’s leadership style is based on “people first”. If indeed so, then why bar the Orang Asli who protested over unfair land policy from marching to the Prime Minister’s Department in Putrajaya? Why re-route them to the Rural Development Ministry and silence their dissatisfaction by feeding their stomachs? Why did the police not allow the Orang Asli to display their banners and allow only five of them to go to the PM’s Department to hand over the memorandum? Is this what “people first” is all about?
The Orang Asli were not armed with machetes or guns and nor were they marching to the PM’s Department to beat up anyone. All they wanted was an assurance from Najib on their land status and to receive their memorandum. Mind you, it was an effort to gather the Orang Asli who travelled to Putrajaya in 40 buses. It was not a demonstration to cause riot, so why did the police halt their march?
This march, according to the Centre for Orang Asli Concerns, Colin Nicholas, was the biggest Orang Asli demonstration in history and yet there was no respect shown by the leader of the country towards their worries.
So many other incidents have taken place that have revealed that 1Malaysia is strictly Najib’s political means to win the next general election. The rakyat never came first and the truth is they never will.
Jeswan Kaur, a freelance journalist cum writer, is a contributor to Free Malaysia Today
Also read:
FMT editorial: The Perkasa distraction
Perkasa soldiers on despite royal rebuff
Stand firm! DAP grandmaster tells 'fickle' Najib
西方多国声援安华 全球国会联盟吁撤肛交案
西方多国声援安华 全球国会联盟吁撤肛交案
委任观察员聆听安华审讯
全 球国会联盟吁撤肛交案
作者／本刊记者 Apr 02, 2010 07:42:46 pm
【本刊记者撰述】国会在野党领 袖安华依布拉欣所涉及的肛交案不但获得美澳关注，如今更获得全球性的国会联盟（IPU）声援，向联盟理事会建议七项议案，包括要求撤销此案及委任观察员出 席接下来的审讯。
国会 联盟的国会议员人权委员会（Committee of IPU On the Human Rights of Parliamentarians）在昨天于泰国曼谷举行的国会联盟会议上宣布，他们一致决定针对安华肛交案向国会联盟理事会（Governing Council）提出建议。国会议员人权委员会主席菲律宾参议院在野党领袖皮门特（Senator Aquilino Q Pimentel, Jr）说“考虑到安华最近的肛交诉讼案，广遭批判为意图破坏安华的政治生涯”，因此，向理事会提出下列议案：
（一） 高度关注安华所面对的新一起肛交案控诉和审讯，此案漏洞重重，就跟数年前他已被判无罪的首次肛交案一样；
（二） 相信在两份医药报告显示出，没有“插入”（penetration）体征的情况之下，不应该提出控诉，而现在更应该撤销此案；
（三） 涉及首宗肛交案审讯的检控团成员，即曾被指控为捏造证据陷害安华、当时的主控官而现任总检察长阿都干尼（Abdul Gani Patail），再度涉及第二宗审讯，而安华辩护律师团则被禁止取得有关证据以准备辩护；
（四）在此提醒 诉讼案中双方的平等权利，公平审讯中的辩护很重要，而若无法让辩方履行其权利，那法庭的任何裁决基本上都存有瑕疵；
（五） 要求总秘书做出必要的安排，以确保有审讯观察员出席接下来的审讯；
（六）要求总秘书联络马来西亚国会当 局；
（七）请求给于委员会继续调查这起案件，并在今年10月份举行的第123届国会联盟会议中提出报告。
出 席第122届国会联盟会议的三名民联国会议员联署发表文告，他们是公正党八打灵再也南区（Petaling Jaya Selatan）国会议员许来贤、行动党马六甲市（Kota Melaka）国会议员沈同钦，以及回教党上议员孟塔兹（Mumtaz Md Nawi）。
所 有出席会议的代表都支持上述所有议案，只有马来西亚保留看法。全 球共有145个国家的国会议员出席这场盛会。国会联盟（Inter-Parliamentary Union）成立于1889年，是全球国会的国际性组织，总部位于瑞士日内瓦，其宗旨为各国议会间搭起沟通的桥梁，促进民主及和平。
西 方多国声援安华
今年2月11日，超过50名澳洲国会议员和上议员呈交一封联署信函给马来西亚驻澳 洲最高专员，要求马来西亚司法机构撤销对安华肛交案的检控。
过后，美国参议院外交委员会主席约翰克里 （John Kerry）也发表声明，促马来西亚给予安华公平的审讯。他说：“我呼吁马来西亚政府，特别是首相纳吉确保针对前首相安华展开的法律程序公平和无私的裁 决。”
澳洲国会外交事务委员会主席迈克丹比（Michael Danby）早前亦出奇地指摘马来西亚的司法系统被利用以将安华驱离政治，且说这项提控令亚洲的民主派大吃一惊，每一个马来西亚人和每个国际法律界的人士 都知道安华是清白的。
此外，前加拿大总理保罗马丁（Paul Martin）亦就安华肛交案呛声，显见纳吉政府在这起案件中面对了极大的国际压力。
How Ultra-Malay has dispossessed the indigenous peoples in Malaysia
How Ketuanan Melayu has dispossessed the Orang Asli
By Dr Boo Cheng Hau & Helen Ang
COMMENT Malaysia is the Asia-Pacific’s “best model” in dealing with the rights of indigenous peoples – or so it is claimed. Last Saturday (incidentally the same day Dr Mahathir Mohamad launched the Perkasa inaugural congress), BN MP Makcus Mojigoh said, in his paper presented at a regional conference, that the government is serious about the plight of the Orang Asli.
Really? The Orang Asli don’t think so.
Mojigoh’s comments follow on the heels of the march by more than 2,000 Orang Asli from all over the country on March 17 in Putrajaya. They had gathered to demand recognition of their customary rights to ancestral land – “Tanah kami, maruah kami” was the rallying cry.
The protest is not surprising as the Orang Asli have increasingly been pushed to the margins by Ketuanan Melayu – since the infamous Malay Dilemma of Mahathir and long before that.
Mahathir argued in his 1970 book that the Orang Asli are not the definitive people of the peninsular as they did not form the first effective government, and moreover “at no time did they outnumber the Malays”.
Furthermore, he brushed off the notion that Orang Asli might have prior claims above “the right of the Malays to regard the Malay peninsula as their own country...” and cited his own reading of history to bolster the Malay contention.
Today, learning from school textbooks, pupils would be left with the impression that Malaysian history started from the Malaccan Sultanate, and that before the conversion to Islam of the prince Parameswara, the country was some kind of no-man’s land.
The Malay Dilemma also contended that “in fact, there are no more than a few thousand aborigines”. Contrary to Mahathir’s assertion rubbishing their numbers, in 1969 there were 52,943 Orang Asli.
Orang Asli are not a single ethnic group but collectively composed of 18 (official) tribes. The biggest grouping is classed Senoi, who are the Semai, Temiar, Jah Hut, Che Wong, Mah Meri and Semoq Beri tribes, while two other groupings are Negrito and proto-Malay. All are indigenous people.
Similar to apartheid
According to historians, Orang Asli had been victims of the slave trade by the Malays and Bataks. Despite official denials of slavery, Orang Asli oral literature has indeed recorded slave raids. The English colonial official JWW Birch had documented their enslavement since as early as 1874.
“
...one fact remains the same for all Orang Asli: they are the descendants of the earliest inhabitants of the peninsula.
Totalling some 147,500 in 2003, Orang Asli comprise about 0.6 percent of the population, and are disenfranchised on many counts.
Commenting on the demonstration in Putrajaya, Suhakam vice-chairman Simon Sipaun said: “It is expected that the Orang Asli community would protest as they have been marginalised in a system similar to apartheid."
Previously in South Africa, the white Afrikaner nationalists used an ideology almost identical to that propounded by Mahathir to justify their own indigenous status above the black Khoisan, who, according to the white supremacists, had never established a "civilised government".
If one were to look at Article 153 of our federal constitution, it says that the "special position" is extended only to Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak. Omitting mention of the Orang Asli in the said article excludes them from the guarantee of quotas.
[But] ‘We are not Malays, we will always be Orang Asli’ – declare the placards hoisted in Putrajaya on March 17. How then?
‘Refugees’ in own country
Not too long ago on Feb 24, a group of Orang Asli held a demonstration outside the Orang Asli Affairs Department (JHEOA) hospital in Gombak. Speaking to reporters, their spokesman Sokyen Man said the hospital is dominated by non-Orang Asli who are incapable of fulfilling the needs of the community.
The group submitted a petition against the hospital which said, among other things: “A lot of us have faced medical staff who are uncomfortable with the Orang Asli. Sometimes, they pass comments on our features and skin colour.” This particular complaint infers that they are considered an ‘out group’ or ‘inferior group’ (implied by the derogatory connotations of ‘sakai’) by the mainstream.
The term ‘Orang Asli’ was first used by the post-Independence federal government and means "the original people". Colin Nicholas of the Centre for Orang Asli Concerns (COAC) notes, “one fact remains the same for all Orang Asli: they are the descendants of the earliest inhabitants of the peninsula".
It is they whose fate could well be equated with that of aborigines in Australia, Maoris in New Zealand and Native Americans in the United States. This is a more compelling comparison than Utusan Malaysia’s constant, tiresome refrain that Malays are like Palestinians in their own homeland.
It is the Orang Asli who are akin to displaced refugees!
Most destitute group
Going by any socio-economic indicator, the Orang Asli are the worst off among all the local ethnic groups. About half live below the poverty line – according to the government’s most recent statistics. Relative to the other races, their children are malnourished and have high infant mortality rate; and Orang Asli have a lower life expectancy.
A bitter irony is that the authorities insist on perpetuating the myth that Orang Asli are "nomadic". According to Robert Dentan, most of the Orang Asli have in fact settled in stable lifestyles although a small number remain semi-nomadic.
There are about 870 Orang Asli settlements (as at December 2003) mainly in Pahang, Perak and Kelantan. More than 500 of these villages are considered to be located in the fringe and 323 in the interior. About 400 villages are categorised as "backward".
If at all Orang Asli can be regarded as nomadic foragers roaming in the forest or “tanah rayau” – a dismissive phraseology adopted by the government – it is this very government that is forcing them to move from place to place.
The Temuans in Sepang and Bangi had their land taken from them to build KLIA and UKM respectively. In Stulang Laut in Johor, the Orang Seletar were relocated to make way for a commercial and customs complex.
The “regroupment” – an euphemistic official doublespeak – of Orang Asli settlements has resulted in even their resettlements again giving way to logging, mining concessions, highway projects, industrial parks and golf courses.
National Land Act
The federal government expects to table amendments to the National Land Act in Parliament by June. It is learned that the new legislation will give the Orang Asli only 50,000 hectares of the 128,000-ha land they live on, which ultimately amounts to “a policy of planned poverty”.
The Bar Council has recommended the following legal measures on the Orang Asli land issues to empower the community:
- the issuance of individual land titles to every indigenous family;
- the gazetting of communal land parcels by the state governments under Section 62 of the National Land Code 1965;
- the gazetting of communal land parcels under the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 with perpetual and unlimited foraging rights extending beyond the gazetted communal land parcels; and
- in exceptional cases of certain semi-nomadic indigenous communities, who are the most vulnerable of indigenous peoples, perpetual and unlimited foraging rights (with concomitant and greater opportunities for education and vocational training towards sustaining their livelihood).
The courts, especially in the Sagong Tasi case, have however deemed such thinking as archaic and unconstitutional. The Orang Asli do exercise native title rights over their traditional lands under common law. But it appears the government is not about to accept this legal precedent.
Writing in Aliran, Yogeswaran Subramaniam observes, “If past records are anything to go by, the states’ performance for gazetting Orang Asli reserves has been nothing short of dismal."
Changing the face of Orang Asli
The policy that the government is now putting on the table does not recognise customary lands but instead proposes to change the face of Orang Asli land into plantations.Orang Asli who accept the government’s deal offering 50,000 ha (amounting to just over one hectare per household and with no forests) will not be able to bring any claims later to the courts for customary lands or loss of such lands.
The Aliran article calculated that even assuming Orang Asli want to operate oil palm smallholdings at one hectare, each household will only be able to produce around 15 tonnes annually.
The cash crop sold at RM500 a tonne would bring net earnings of RM5,000 a year, or average income of just over RM400 a month – a poverty level income!
The Orang Asli are a vulnerable minority who have been physically removed from their traditional source of livelihood in the forests. Government coercion has additionally caused the erosion of their traditions, customs and values – and its attendant side-effect of mental stress.
They did not venture to the swanky Putrajaya for “school-holiday sightseeing” as gibed by the condescending Rural Development Minister Shafie Apdal. The Orang Asli descended on the administrative capital because the community has reached a crisis level.
Related stories:
Orang Asli in protest march over land rights
1Malaysia - politics first, people later
Indigenous Malaysians protest proposed land bill
End 'emergency' laws now, says groups
Proposed Orang Asli land policy: Planned poverty?
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Dr Boo Cheng Hau is the Johor DAP chairman and the state assemblyman for Skudai while Helen Ang is an online media columnist. This article first appeared at the Centre For Policy Initiatives' website.
http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/fmt-english/opinion/comment/4143-how-ketuanan-melayu-has-dispossessed-the-orang-asli
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