2011年10月20日星期四
HIMPUN : 进退维谷的纳吉
更何况HIMPUN的动机是号召回教徒反改教,其矛头是暗指向其他宗教,极其可能会引起宗教冲突的。
反之,BERSIH2.0只是要求干净公平的选举,却被列为非法。
这难免让人民猜测HIMPUN有巫统政府在背后撑腰。
虽然巫统否认策划本周六在莎阿南体育馆举行的“百万穆斯林大集会” (Himpunan Sejuta Ummah,简称HIMPUN )大集会,可是没有几个人会相信的。
还有,HIMPUN 突出了不允许人改教的不民主作风,让国际社会看了,只会增加不良印象。
看来,HIMPUN 的发起人让纳吉陷入进退维谷的困境了。
2011年9月28日星期三
柯嘉逊揭官方独立史迷思 探真正多元族群合作起源
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2011年9月16日星期五
纳吉的“政改”:太少、太假
| 冷眼 2011年9月16日 上午 10点28分 |
更重要的一点是,纳吉没列出落实各项“改革”措施的时程。人们记忆犹新的是,前首相马哈迪如何在1999年大选前“接受”《华团诉求》,胜选后却翻脸不认账的鬼伎俩!人民如何能确信,奉行“马哈迪主义”的纳吉不会效尤呢?
在 宣布废除内安法之前,政府一直不肯松口,纳吉的亲信内长希山慕丁甚至一口否定废除内安法的“揣测”,并表示内政部对内安法等6项法律的修改已进入尾声,即 将提呈给内阁云云。那么,为何突然有此戏剧性转变?是不是跟纳吉的民调支持率下跌有关呢?是不是大选前的又一场大型公关秀呢?
笔者注意到,纳吉还提到将以两项新法律“保护公共安全”,但却没深入说明。到时政府会不会以新瓶装旧酒呢?
首 相说要撤销印刷媒体每年更新出版准证的条文,只需申请准证一次,就可以使用到撤销为止。然而,由于批准和撤销出版准证的大权依然操控在内政部长手中,不受 司法审查,其松绑作用想必有限。再加上印刷媒体拥有权都集中在执政党或亲执政党集团手中,新闻尺度因自我审查而不可能会有太大的改进。
首 相也宣布将检讨警察法第27条文以及联邦宪法第10条款对集会自由的限制,但政府仍坚决反对街头示威。集会示威的其中一个目的是要向外传播诉求或主张,如 果集会只能在体育场里举行,那么这种“松绑”有何意义可言?如果纳吉真的关注自由与人权,就应该全面重修警察法,拿掉警察的过度权力,并成立“警察滥权投 诉独立调查委员会”(IPCMC)。
更重要的一点是,纳吉没列出落实各项“改革”措施的时程。人们记忆犹新的是,前首相马哈迪如何在1999年大选前“接受”《华团诉求》,胜选后却翻脸不认账的鬼伎俩!人民如何能确信,奉行“马哈迪主义”的纳吉不会效尤呢?
必 须说,首相所宣布的措施原则上是好的,缺的只是诚意、力度、广度和公信力。人民要的是有诚意的、全面的、不可逆转的改革步骤,而不是快熟面式的随兴措施。 首相如果真的有心还政于民,就应该提出一个严谨的路线图,从净选盟的8大诉求开始,逐步落实政治改革,在初见成效之前决不举行下届大选。
http://malaysiakini.com/letters/175980
2011年7月29日星期五
被压迫的人,没有选择的奢侈!
| 周小芳 2011年7月29日 下午 1点44分 |
当皇委会说赵明福是自杀的,当我看了那小说般的报告内容,我的心情顿时跌入谷底。
我一想到赵丽兰,她的心结永远都不会被打开,我明白那种受害者情意结,还有那失去自由的六名社会主义党党员,明明是为人民斗争的勇士,却背负莫须有的罪名,想到这,我的眼泪就不能停了。
曾经宁愿孩子们不知情
想到这些受害者的家属,我终于明白当年学长在大学时对我说过的一句话:“被压迫的人,没有选择的奢侈!”
我曾经认为,让内安法令扣留者的小孩从小就接触政府的不好,让他们出席集会,对他们不好。我情愿告诉他们:“你的爸爸现在在远方工作,他很快会回来的”,就像肥猫的妈妈欺骗肥猫,他的爸爸去了行船那样。
我会情愿让他们快快乐乐地渡过童年,像常人一样生活,不会觉得自己和别人的小孩有何异样。如果我是他们,我也不愿意这么快知道真相,我情愿天真无邪多几年。
只能教导孩子如何面对
结果学长说:“幸福的人,当然可以‘安排’适合的时间,去让孩子循序渐进地去接触社会的阴晦和黑暗。但是,当阴晦和黑暗在你‘安排’的时间前出现时,对不起,你没有选择……你只能教你孩子如何面对,或示范给他们看如何逃避现实(不让他知道)”
如今,我终于深切体会,被暴政压迫的人,原来真的没有选择的余地。没有人会在压迫来临前,就准备好受压迫,但当压迫来敲你的门的时候,你只能勇敢去面对。
突来横祸只能坚强面对
6名扣留者的家属本来可以一家团圆,享受天伦之乐或与爱人甜蜜相聚,但却因亲人被无理扣留,需要不断奔波警局,每天晚上风雨不改的在警局前点蜡烛,只为了盼望家人早日归来。
脑海突闪过709万人潮
我当然知道不能放弃的道理,我当然知道斗争还是要继续下去,但是我真的很伤心很伤心很伤心……
当大家都依然沉浸在709的自豪,依然在为自己上街感到沾沾自喜的时候,我很纳闷,就因为社会主义党看起来是“印度人党”,就因为那6人是遭紧急法令扣留,不是恶名昭彰的内安法令,就因为他们被逮捕看似和大家毫无关系,所以就没有什么人关注他们?
最近我出席该党在怡保九洞的烛光会,只有区区70人出席,可是我的同事却告诉我,这样的人数已经算很多了,那一刻,我的脑海闪过7月9日当天数之不尽的人潮。
为何只有百人烛光会?
我实在很纳闷,为何在如此高压的情况下,有成千上万的人涌上街头,但是在6人被逮捕后,却只能有百多人支持那看起来较为安全的烛光会?
我实在太焦急,我只能一直在网上不断呼吁大家关注此事,只能出席他们的烛光会,即使特地出城只为了出席一场烛光会,这些小小的事情,是我可以做的,也是大家可以做的。
不要等悲剧发生才悲恸
最后,再也古玛甚至选择了绝食抗议!到底是什么原因,要让已经有病在身的再也古玛选择走上绝食这条路呢?必然,那已经是斗争的最后战役了!
赵明福在被扣留其间坠楼,一切发生得太突然,我们无法做什么来挽回他的生命,但这6名已经被扣留35天的人,是活生生的生命啊!是我们可以拯救的人,希望大家不要等到悲剧发生以后,才来为他们悲恸。
我一想到这些事情也可能随时发生在我认识的朋友身上时,就惊觉那双无形的手原来是如此的靠近。
这些受暴政逼迫的家属没有权选择自己的家人何时遇害或何时被扣,但我们大家却有权选择是否要伸出援手。
当你认为事不关己,己不劳心的时候,你真的能保证这样的事情永远不会发生在你的身上吗?
http://malaysiakini.com/news/171409
2011年7月16日星期六
2011年5月6日星期五
[转贴] 纳吉不可躲的抉择:极右或中间?
| 白云山 2011年5月5日 傍晚 7点33分 |
今天,极右派的跋扈气焰冲天,把一个马来西亚熏烤得天昏地暗。纳吉贵为首相,贵为 “一个马来西亚”中庸治国理念提倡者、推动者,竟对这群公然捣毁其 “理念”的“破坏王”袖手旁观,实属荒谬。
假如纳吉不是具有“理念喜欢被人破坏”的特殊嗜好,那么上述理念只不过是虚假理念,否则应当竭尽所能捍卫其理念。因此,作为混淆的选民,我们有必要要求纳吉公告其政治取向——偏向极右,抑或靠向中间?
纳吉不能继续躲在“一个马来西亚”的龟壳里自欺欺人,蒙混过去 。如果他偏向极右,就不要再到处推销象征中庸的“一个马来西亚”,就像卖的是葡萄酒,就别说那是葡萄汁,否则就是欺骗。
如果纳吉偏向中间,那么就必须站在极右份子,包括副手慕尤丁、恩师马哈迪、土权组织的对立面,至少说服他们放弃极右立场,尤其是规劝副手慕尤丁以马来西亚人优先,而非马来人优先,否则有违 “以民为本”(rakyat didahulukan)的“一个马来西亚”精神。
同时,纳吉如果真的拥护中间路线,那么应当对屡屡发表仇视华裔和非马来人言论的极右团体土权组织和极右报章《马来西亚前锋报》,予以谴责,并警告对方勿破坏其宣扬的“一个马来西亚”理念。
迄今为止,纳吉对极右势力的崛起和胡作妄为保持优雅的沉默(elegant silence)。如果他想要继续当“一个马来西亚”的首相,重获人民,尤其是非马来人的支持,就必须打破缄默,与极右集团决裂——极右或中间,两者选一。
至于马华,虽然表面上与极右势力针锋相对,彼此暗渡陈仓、默契十足,马华议员和领袖曾经与土权组织同台示威就是最佳佐证。明知华社厌恶极右团体,却与之相亲,马华勿怪华社唾弃自己。
马华亲近极右团体,后者不以礼相待,反而不时羞辱马华,但马华依旧逆来顺受。最近,土权组织变本加厉,直捣马华总部示威,力挺《前锋报》的“一个土著论”。
对于土权的挑衅和羞辱,马华继续忍辱偷生扮演文告政党的角色。所谓的高调问政就是文告问政,发发文告,聊以自慰。马华作为一个号称拥有百万党员的全球第三大华人政党,虽在朝54年,面对一个仅成立3年的小组织的无理取闹,竟无力还击,任其欺凌,实为耻辱。
正是马华的懦弱,迫使华裔陆续离弃。“知耻近乎勇”,马华若要绝地反击成功,此时就必须鼓起勇气向极右集团宣战,但不是文告战,而是以行动展示马华对极右路线的厌恶,对实现“一个马来西亚”平等理念的热诚——极右或中间,两者选一。
如果纳吉和马华无法以强硬姿态对付极右集团,无力捍卫自身倡导的“一个马来西亚”理念,那么就别奢望华社支持,别怪罪华社不支持。
为了实现平权的愿景,华社连“恐回症”(islamophobia)都能克服,投票支持回教党,所以“种族两线制”并不存在。当下逐渐成形的是“极右/中间两线制”,而大部份华裔选民和城市选民都是中间路线的拥护者。
鉴此,纳吉和马华必须在极右和中间路线之间做出抉择,不然将面对政权倾覆之虞,这是华裔选民给你们的最后通牒。
后记:
2007 年11月9日的巫统代表大会上,前首相阿都拉警告准备参与“浄选盟大集会”(Bersih Rally)的人民说:“Saya pantang dicabar”(我忌讳被挑战)。结果两天后,万人涌上街头展示rakyat pantang dicabar的力量,间接催生了来年的308政治海啸,进而结束阿都拉庸庸碌碌的政治生涯。
纳吉没有吸取历史 教训,以威胁口吻警告华社,这或许是他自断江山的伏笔。人民和从政者应以电影 《V for Vendetta》的一句对白奉为圭皋:人民不该畏惧政府,应是政府畏惧人民 (People should not be afraid of their governments. Government should afraid of their people)。
http://malaysiakini.com/letters/163370
2011年4月20日星期三
A case of too little too late!
A case of too little too late!
Ironically, both BN and PR leaders are happy with the Sarawak election results. The only exception is SUPP but even their own leaders knew about their fate long before election was called..
BN leaders have expected something even worse. In fact, just a few months ago some of them have privately expressed the fear that they may lose more than one third of seats. So to them, to be able to secure more than two third, despite losing more seats than 2006, is a good result. The fact that PM was there for the whole week was due to this fear of losing the two-third.
PR of course is happy since they double their representation, even though it has fallen short of their one third target.
The results reaffirms what we know all along: that the urban votes are now dead against BN, not just the urban Chinese, but urban Dayaks, and in West Malaysia, even some percentage of urban Malays and Indians too.
A reader whom I suspect is a BN member since he uses the BN sales pitch wrote the following comment in my blog in the last post:
Just think rationally, if the rest of Malaysia is still with BN, won’t you think chinese will be sideline even more than before. All the remaining 5 chinese mayors and all the state ministers post – how many will remain?
As a former member of a component party, I have heard this sales pitch many many times before.
Let us not just argue but look back at recent history.
In 1999, the Malay votes turned against BN because of the Anwar factor, and what saved the day was the Chinese and Indians votes, which helped BN to pull through. In 2004, Chinese votes were generally behind BN and Pak Lah, after he has uttered the famous (or infamous depends on which side you are on) phrase ” work with me, and not for me”. 2004 election was also the one election that BN won the highest percentage of popular votes ever.
So since 1999 till almost 2006, the Chinese sentiments were with the government of the day. They have a relatively high representation inside then.
What did the urban votes get in return? More racism even to the extent of keris raising, more extremist views ( and more double standard when it comes to uttering extremist views) , more marginalisation, more corruption, more so-called pirate-isation privatisation where billions were lost as leakages and wastage, more abuse of power by our various institution to the extent that ISA was used to ‘protect’ a journalist. These were real happenings that occurred during the period when the government of the Day enjoyed relatively high support of the urban people (eg. in KL Gerakan won 2 out of 3 urban seats in 1999 and 2004, seats where there were Chinese majority but with sizeable Malay and Indian voters, and nationally it won 10 of 12 Parliament seats contested).
AT that time, there were many elected Non-Malay Ministers inside the cabinet. The representations were there, but things worsened. The perception is that these people talked outside but dared not voice out inside.
The truth is there were actually 2 types of representations of these component parties inside. One was the quiet type, agreeing to whatever policies decided, and dared not object very strongly, since many of them put their self interest above all else. There was another type that spoke out quite strongly inside too, but being a small voice, the voice was totally ignored. The latter was also the one that would not be allowed to rise up to a high position, since anyone who dared to speak out were chopped and sidelined in every component party without fail.
Many a times members of these component parties were told not to ‘rock’ the boat. In one of the National Delegates’ conference, I actually argued that it was not the members who rocked the boat, it was the ‘ineffective’ leadership and the ‘dare-not-voice-out-too-strongly’ attitude of the top leaders of these component parties that not only rocked but also sank the boat. The voting patterns of 308 and 416 show that what i have uttered is generally true.
So the perception among the urban people is that even with these people inside , their grouses had not been heard.
As a consequence of getting huge support, the government of the day became so arrogant that the some ministers could not even take fair criticism in their stride and acted as if they could never be wrong, since they believed that most people, even the urban ones , were behind them.
It was only after 308, when many of the component parties suffered huge losses and humiliation that the government of the day began to appear to want to seek change. That is how the slogan of ’1Malaysia’ came about. They are forced to seek change not because they wanted it, but because they knew that if they don’t, they would get booted out. It becomes a case of either change or be changed.
It is this fear of losing their power and perks that makes them soften their stand and, and outsource the more extreme parts to their associates in certain NGO.
Ironically, only when the representation of the urban area was at its lowest, did the government of the day realise that there is a need to change. But given the warlord culture, it is a mammoth task.
So when the urban people all voted for the government, they were taken for granted. There were few scholarships, there were few opportunities to get government contracts etc etc. Members of some law enforcement agencies were more busy tending to their own ‘cari makan’ than to catch criminals. Crime rates soared.
These all happened when urban people voted for the government. So i would not blame them if they got fed up and seek to change.
I will quote a true example to show how timid these leaders were inside. When some of the BN chairmanship of parliamentary kawasan of some component parties were taken away by Big Brother last year, I raised the point that if the component parties cannot even fight to retain their own seat allocations, how are they going for fight for the interest of the people? The answer I got from the Top leader (and our representative to Supreme council) was that even CSL (the DVD actor) did not say anything, so he just kept quiet. He then put the blame on his predecessor, the adviser ( note: I canceled the 2 words because the advisor resigned some time back). When a representative who is supposed to represent a component party inside the ‘Supreme Meeting’ cannot even utter the word “No” , how can he effectively represent the people? CSL, as told by my own Top leader, was not vocal at all inside; but outside, he appears to be another man, vocal in quite a number of issues. A typical case of 2 face.
The comment of the our ‘wise’ reader above is actually standard BN sales pitch, and people in the urban areas would not buy this sale pitch anymore. If the government is serious to win back urban votes, they need to do more than sales pitch.
What the government needs to do is not to punish the people who voted against them by withholding development. What they need to do is to find out WHY people voted against them, and tackle the problems at its roots: Be more equal and fairer, be more transparent, be more people orientated, be less corrupt. Adopt policies that are inclusive and will not marginalise any group.
Go direct to the people, even if the urban people have no more representations inside. Listen to the people. They have eyes and ears everywhere, so feel the pulse. .
The fate of the Indians was a good example. While they have voted time and again for BN and MIC, they became the most marginalised group. Only when the NGO Hindraff appeared on the Horizon, did their plight get noticed . But sadly what was being done for them is still not enough, still very far from uplifting this community from poverty.
The Chinese community has asked that the UEC exam be recognised. They have been asking this for many many years. Only now, after the community has shifted their support against the government, did the government come out with some changes to let some of those who pass UEC be admitted into main stream universities. This could not even be achieved during the time when their representation was relatively high inside the government. I think this example speaks plenty for itself that ineffective representation is even worse than no representation.
Tan Sri George Chan has finally hit the nail at its head when he attributed the cause of the routing of SUPP and his own defeat to this : whatever change that was being done was ‘too little and too late”.
Unfortunately, He paid the price for realising this ‘too late’.
http://hsudarren.wordpress.com/2011/04/18/a-case-of-too-little-too-late-2/
